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ON LAW-BREAKING AND LAW’S LEGITIMACY
Aliza Plener Cover
Our criminal justice system is built and justified on the idea
that criminal laws reflect our communal sense of right and wrong;
criminal punishment is theorized as distinct from civil confinement
primarily because of the collective moral opprobrium attached to a
criminal conviction.1 What happens, then, to the legitimacy of
criminal law when large segments of the community persistently
engage in the conduct it prohibits?
The war on drugs catalyzed an era of mass incarceration, a
phenomenon much studied and critiqued by scholars, policymakers,
and advocates.2 Less discussed in legal circles is the coexistence of
mass law-breaking—law-breaking by individuals across racial and
economic lines, within all sectors of society, and in numbers vastly
disproportionate to those serving time. Our last three presidents either
allegedly or admittedly used illicit drugs in their younger days. 3 So,
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1
E.g., Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS 401, 404–05 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction
and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition. . . . [A crime] is
conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”).
2
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); André Douglas Pond Cummings, “All Eyez
on Me”: America’s War on Drugs and the Prison-Industrial Complex, 15 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 417 (2012); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NATION BEHIND BARS: A
HUMAN RIGHTS SOLUTION (2014),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2014_US_Nation_Behind_Ba
rs_0.pdf; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS (2009),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_
32609.pdf.
3
See Clinton Tried Marijuana as a Student, He Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/30/news/30iht-bill_1.html; Bush Faces New
Round of Drug Questions, CNN.COM (Aug. 20, 1999),
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/08/20/president.2000/bush.drug/.
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too, have multiple legislators,4 judges,5 executive officials,6 and
prosecutors.7 They fall squarely within the norm. According to
government data, in 2013, just under 127.5 million (or 48.6%—nearly
half—of) Americans over the age of 12 had, at some point in their
lives, used illicit drugs, and more than 24.5 million (or 9.4%) had done
so in the past month.8 Meanwhile, in 2012, just over 310,000 inmates
were incarcerated in state and federal facilities for drug offenses 9—a
striking number, but one dwarfed by the millions violating the law
each year.

08/20/president.2000/bush.drug/; BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A
STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE 93–94 (2004 ed.) (candidly admitting cocaine
and marijuana use).
4
Former Representative Trey Radel of Florida, for example, who voted to pass a bill
allowing drug-testing of food stamp recipients, was subsequently convicted of
cocaine possession. See David A. Fahrenthold, Keith L. Alexander and Sari Horwitz,
Rep. Trey Radel of Florida Pleads Guilty to Cocaine Charge, WASH. POST (Nov. 20,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/rep-trey-radel-expected-to-facejudge-on-charges-of-cocaine-possession/2013/11/20/b029caba-51ce-11e3-a7f0b790929232e1_story.html.
5
Justice Clarence Thomas is among them. See Stephen Labaton, Thomas Smoked
Marijuana But Retains Bush Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 11, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/11/us/thomas-smoked-marijuana-but-retains-bushsupport.html.
6
David Paterson was the governor of New York from 2008 to 2010. See David
Paterson Admits Using Cocaine, Marijuana In His 20s, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1,
2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/24/david-paterson-admitsusi_n_93218.html; Michael Bloomberg was mayor of New York City from 2002 to
2013. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Bloomberg Says He Regrets Marijuana Remarks,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/10/nyregion/bloomberg-says-he-regretsmarijuana-remarks.html.
7
E.g., Stephen Visser, Former Fulton Narcotics Prosecutor Disbarred for Felony
Drug Charges, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/former-fulton-narcotics-prosecutor-disbarred-forf/nj3N3/.
8
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, RESULTS
FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES,
Table 1.1B, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHDetTabs2013/NSDUH-DetTabs2013.htm#tab1.1a.
9
See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2013 16–17, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf (98,900 drug
offenders were incarcerated in federal facilities and 210,200 in state penal
institutions). This tally includes offenses such as the distribution of drugs that
encompass conduct beyond simple possession. See id.
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In this essay, I argue that persistent, mass law-breaking is a
phenomenon worthy of significant scholarly and policymaking
attention. In the context of the war on drugs, mass law-breaking
undermines the legitimacy of harsh sentencing practices and weighs in
favor of a new approach. I argue here that widespread law-breaking is
not always a scourge to be eliminated; sometimes, it is a grassroots
expression of community morality to be heeded. I urge here that lawmakers and law-enforcers should not only seek to suppress, but also to
learn from and adapt because of, widespread law-breaking. In making
this argument, I begin by identifying three primary ways in which
mass law-breaking undermines and reveals deficiencies in the
legitimacy of the law. I then note limitations on my argument, and
conclude.
First, mass law-breaking weakens the law’s legitimacy by
destabilizing its connection to community standards of justice and
morality.10 As Paul Robinson has notably argued, a wide gap between
“the community’s shared intuitions of justice” and formal law
endangers both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the criminal justice
system.11 In the context of the war on drugs, the unrelenting
prevalence of illicit drug use constitutes powerful empirical evidence
that the retributive calculations of criminal drug policy are out of sync
with the moral orientation of large swaths of the community. Rates of
law-breaking are not the only indicators of community standards of
justice: social science literature assessing the moral intuitions of
ordinary citizens through research studies and surveys present
significant evidence, as well.12 Yet the organic data points of actual
10

Problematically, the Supreme Court tends to ignore the possibility of such a
schism. In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, for example, the Supreme Court
considers harsh sentencing laws to be in and of themselves determinative of
community norms about appropriate punishment. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (laying out principles of
proportionality review that emphasized deference to legislative judgments and
authorized overturning such judgments only under extreme circumstances of gross
disproportionality of sentence to crime).
11
Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice
as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2011) (“One may conclude,
then, that the crime-control power of the criminal law depends in some significant
part upon how well it tracks the community's shared intuitions of justice.”).
12
See Paul H. Robinson et. al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940
(2010). Like mass law-breaking, such surveys suggest that punishment practices are
out of step with community norms. See id. at 1976–77 (“The available empirical
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conduct—of real-world illicit drug use—provide particularly
compelling information. Sometimes people express their moral
standards not only through their words, but also—and sometimes more
truthfully13—through their actions. When a significant percentage of
society breaks—or has, in the past, broken—a particular law, this fact
impacts the actual and perceived legitimacy of harshly punishing that
conduct.
Second, mass law-breaking undercuts the law’s legitimacy by
revealing its ineffectuality. The persistence of pervasive illicit drug
use shows a pragmatic failure of the war on drugs to achieve its
desired end; it undermines the deterrence rationale on which the drug
war is justified and hence the legitimacy of the war itself. Cast in its
noblest light, the drug war was an effort to eradicate and deter
harmful, widespread behavior. Yet, several decades and several
billions of dollars later, the continued ubiquity of illicit drug use
provides significant evidence that harsh criminal sanctions are not
working, and therefore cannot be justified even on utilitarian
grounds.14
Third, mass law-breaking undermines law’s legitimacy by
starkly illuminating its discriminatory impact. Pervasive illicit drug
use across racial groups, alongside racially-disparate patterns of
punishment, raises a compelling inference of discriminatory
evidence suggests that, while many people see drug offenses as serious, they
typically are not viewed as being nearly as blameworthy as current sentences would
suggest . . . .” (explaining and citing studies)); Robinson, supra note 11, at 1107
(“One may well ask how well current American criminal law matches the
community’s intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modern crimecontrol programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties, adult
prosecution of juveniles, narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability offenses, and
the felony-murder rule, all distribute criminal liability and punishment in ways that
seriously conflict with lay persons’ intuitions of justice.”).
13
See, e.g. Fahrenthold, Alexander & Horwitz supra note 4. Imagine a legislator—
such as Representative Trey Radel—who votes for the passage of a tough-on-drugs
bill but who is caught using drugs recreationally. Which conduct is more truthfully
indicative of his view of decency? His public decrial of illicit drug use, in a system
that disproportionately targets poor and minority drug users, or his private
participation in the criminal conduct he publicly seeks to punish?
14
See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle of Deterrence, 6
J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 111, 112–17 (2002) (describing the “apparent failure of
deterrence”).

Cover

314

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 15:2

enforcement—an inference that, once again, undermines the
legitimacy of criminal law.15 While “[s]tudies show that people of all
colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably similar rates,” “[i]n
some states, black men have been admitted to prison on drug charges
at rates twenty to fifty times greater than those of white men.”16 In
2007, only 14% of regular drug users—but “37% of those arrested for
drug offenses and 56% of persons in state prison for drug offenses”—
were African American.17 When punishment, but not law-breaking, is
concentrated disproportionately against minorities, the legitimacy of
the law necessarily unravels.
Persistent and pervasive illicit drug use, in short, weakens the
legitimacy of harsh criminal drug laws by distancing them from
community norms of justice, by revealing their inefficacy, and by
exposing their discriminatory impact. This crisis of legitimacy is not
easily remedied by increased punitiveness. Rather, mass law-breaking
should signal to lawmakers that the criminal law is out of touch with
the community it serves and is in need of change.
Having made the central claim—that mass law-breaking
undermines the legitimacy of harsh criminal sentencing in the drug
context—I will briefly address a few important clarifications and
limitations. First, I do not argue that it is inherently illegitimate to
criminalize any and all misconduct simply because a large number of
people engage in it.18 Taking this argument to its extreme, there
would be no role for a legitimate criminal justice system to protect the
vulnerable from the tyrannical whims of the majority. Instead, I argue
that the frequency of commission of a given offense is an important
factor in assessing the legitimate parameters of its punishment. In
15

See generally Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the
Counter-Majoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141 (2014).
16
ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 7 (footnotes omitted) (also noting that “if there are
significant differences to be found in the surveys, they frequently suggest that
whites, particularly white youth, are more likely to engage in drug crime than people
of color.”).
17
Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, A 25-Year Quagmire: The War on Drugs and Its
Impact on American Society, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 2 (2007),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf.
18
Nor am I asserting that it is right—or at least not wrong—to proverbially jump off
a cliff if everyone is doing it. There is a difference, however, between being wrong
and being subjected to harsh criminal punishment. I do not tackle the moral question
of whether using illicit drugs is “wrong.”
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other words, the criminal justice system loses legitimacy when we
severely punish admittedly criminal conduct that many people decide
to commit.
Second, the ubiquity of criminal conduct poses a less
significant threat to criminal justice legitimacy when that conduct is
violent rather than non-violent. Without recognizing this limitation, a
litany of disturbing hypothetical scenarios might play out. What if a
majority of men abused their spouses? What if it were common
practice for members of the racial majority to commit hate crimes
against racial minorities?
Would serious sanction necessarily
undermine the system’s legitimacy? The answer, to my mind, is
clearly no. Violent conduct19 can sustain harsher punishment within a
legitimate system of punishment, as it inherently involves the
subjugation of another person’s rights or personal security, and its
severe punishment better coheres with community intuitions of
fairness. Many drug offenses, such as simple or repeated possession,
clearly do not fall within this understanding of violence, whatever
their (disputed) social harm may be.20
Third, my argument has a special, and perhaps a singular,
significance in the drug context. The troika of (1) extraordinary high
rates of illicit drug use; (2) historical and, in many places, continuing
harsh punishment of drug offenses and the catalytic role of the drug
war in the advent of mass incarceration; and (3) the non-violent nature
of many drug crimes creates a perfect storm for undermining the
legitimacy of the criminal law. There simply is no other type of crime
in the modern criminal landscape that bears each of these
characteristics; drug possession offenses are sui generis.
Consider other illegal conduct that is similarly pervasive.
Traffic offenses, for example, are enormously widespread.21 To the
19

Defining “violence” is itself a fraught endeavor worthy of additional
consideration. For the federal definition of a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 16
(2006).
20
See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Liberty Lost: The Moral Case for
Marijuana Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 279, 283–85 (2010) (arguing that “marijuana
criminalization cannot be justified on grounds of harm to others”).
21
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, 2013 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW 1 (2014),
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812101.pdf.
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extent that drug use, though inherently non-violent, bears potential
harmful societal consequences, traffic violations are risky, too: in
2013, 32,719 people died in traffic accidents nationwide.22 Yet
American jails and prisons are not filled with legions of traffic
offenders.23 We simply do not punish traffic violations harshly except
in rare circumstances where vehicular misconduct bears harmful realworld consequences.24 Statutes criminalizing adultery, sodomy, and
fornication similarly punish ubiquitous conduct—but, even to the
extent that these prohibitions remain on the books or are
constitutional,25 since the mid-twentieth century, they have rarely
resulted in prosecution and virtually never in severe sanctions.26
On the other end of the spectrum, types of criminal conduct
that do bear harsh punishment are significantly less common than
illicit drug use, and much of it cannot possibly be described as nonviolent. Consider serious violent crime rates: In 2013, with the United
States population at over 316 million, the FBI reported 14,196 murders
and non-negligent manslaughters, 79,770 rapes, 345,031 robberies,
and 724,149 aggravated assaults.27 In 2010, government data
estimated “females nationwide experienced about 270,000 rape or
sexual assault victimizations.”28 Property crimes, though far more
numerous than violent crimes, were nonetheless dramatically fewer
than the drug usage numbers considered above, with nearly two
22

See id.
See generally CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crimein-the-u.s.2013/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volu
me_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1994-2013.xls (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
[hereinafter Crime in U.S.].
24
See id.
25
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas
statute prohibiting same-sex sodomy).
26
See Joanne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall, and Continuing Uses of
Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 127, 129–30 (2014)
(“Although they are probably unconstitutional violations of privacy under Lawrence
v. Texas, adultery and fornication laws exist. Almost twenty states currently have
statutes criminalizing adultery, fornication, or both.”) (footnotes omitted).
27
See Crime in U.S. supra note 23.
28
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994-2010 1 (2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf (this data includes reported and
non-reported instances).
23
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million burglaries, just over six million larcenies, and just under
700,000 motor vehicle thefts.29 These numbers reflect crimes, not
criminals, and assuming that at least some proportion of these offenses
were committed by the same individuals, there were considerably
fewer law-breakers than crimes—and vastly fewer law-breakers than
law-abiders.30 This would be the case even assuming significant
under-reporting of certain types of crimes such as sexual assault.
Illicit drug use, on the other hand, operates at a different level of
magnitude; and it would be impossible to accurately capture
community sentiment on drugs without accounting for the vast
numbers of drug users.
Finally, I recognize that the argument articulated above stands
in tension with some deterrence theorists’ views of criminal
punishment: that, as a matter of efficacy, severe punishments are
justified to quell widespread, hard-to-detect behavior.31 I embrace that
tension. I suggest a directly opposite principle: that, as a matter of
legitimacy, the severity of punishment should be constrained when the
criminalized behavior is widespread. My position harmonizes with
that of many modern deterrence theorists who have cast doubt on the
utilitarian value of harsh, infrequent punishments, instead advocating
moderate yet predictable sanctions as the more effective method of
deterring problem behavior—in part because of their increased
legitimacy.32
In this essay, I claim that the ubiquity of criminal conduct, and
in particular non-violent criminal conduct, undermines the legitimacy
of severely punishing that conduct. Widespread illicit conduct
provides an important, objective data point that community members
deem the conduct unworthy of severe sanction. Moreover, when mass
29

See Crime in U.S. supra note 23.
See id.
31
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 988–89 (1991) (explaining how
deterrence justifies the harsh punishment of crimes that are difficult to detect).
32
See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME &
JUST. 199, 202 (2013) (“[C]ertainty of apprehension and not the severity of the legal
consequence ensuing from apprehension is the more effective deterrent.”); see also
Robinson, supra note 11 at 1106 (arguing for the increased utilitarian efficacy of the
criminal law if “it earns a reputation as a moral authority, that is, if people come to
see it as a system that reliably punishes in ways consistent with people’s intuitions of
justice”).
30
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law-breaking persists in the face of harsh punishment, it is evidence of
the ineffectuality of the criminal regime. And when law-breaking
extends across racial and demographic groups, but punishment is
concentrated within minority populations, it provides evidence of
discriminatory enforcement that undermines the legitimacy of law as a
whole.
The moment is ripe for a conversation about the corrosive
effects of harsh and selective punishment of behavior that is pervasive
within our society. In recent years and months, dramatic steps have
been taken toward drug sentencing reform,33 even as punitive drug
policies remain firmly entrenched in many parts of the country. 34 In
this lingering era of mass incarceration, with hundreds of thousands in
prison for conduct committed by tens of millions more, taking
seriously the impact of mass law-breaking on law’s legitimacy could
open critical new avenues for reform.

33

Four states and the District of Columbia have legalized recreational marijuana use.
See Niraj Chokshi, Alaska Legalizes Marijuana Today. Here’s How Its Law
Compares to All the Others, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/24/alaska-legalizesmarijuana-today-heres-how-its-law-compares-to-all-the-others/. In 2013, citing
“unduly harsh sentences and perceived or actual disparities” in sentencing, as well as
“rising prison costs,” former Attorney General Eric Holder announced a relaxation
of the Department of Justice’s traditionally punitive approach toward prosecuting
drug crimes. Memorandum from Eric Holder to the United States Attorneys and
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memodepartment-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivistenhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf (issuing new policy against prosecutorial
charging decisions triggering mandatory-minimum sentences if certain criteria are
satisfied, such as a nonviolent offense, no serious criminal history, and no major
connection with organized crime). President Obama has launched a major clemency
initiative to alleviate historically harsh drug sentencing practices, with 46 clemency
petitions granted on July 13, 2015 alone. See CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative (last updated Jan. 13,
2016); Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Gardiner Harris, Obama Commutes Sentences for
46 Drug Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1Je2cHE.
34
See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966(E)(2), (3) (2012) (in Louisiana, a second
marijuana offense is punishable by a sentence of up to five years in prison and a
third by up to 20 years in prison); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(4)(aA) (2012)
(a fourth marijuana offense triggers a sentence of 20 year to life).

